5 HN users recommended this talk7 months2011–2019score 7.5
Years with an HN recommendation, 2007–2026
HN keeps pointing to it as a long, fascinating talk on cryptographic, verifiable voting whenever e-voting security comes up.
A Google Tech Talk by Steve Weis that introduces modern cryptography and its use in practice and at Google. It covers proofs of security and security definitions and a special topic. HN commenters treat it as a talk on verifiable electronic voting.
“Here's a long but fascinating tech talk on a real solution” (HN, 2014)
I can't believe this talk hasn't been posted yet! Theory and Practice of Cryptography: Verifying Elections with Cryptography [this video] This is probably one of the homomorphic schemes mentioned in TFA. It's very old (2007-ish?) and the state of the art probably advanced, but it's very interesting and addresses a number of points that are not cared for in TFA (like secret ballots verifiable by the voter but impossible to prove to anyone else).
Verifiable voter secret ballots, impossible to prove to others
Youtube users: 'UserGroupsatGoogle' and 'GoogleTechTalks' post some epic content for the more advanced programmer. Continuous Integration with Hudson: [link] Cryptography Theory and practice: [this video]
> counted by hand. By whom? Overseen by whom? Who oversees the overseers? Not to mention people make mistakes, ballots get dumped, and nobody has any evidence their vote was actually counted. Here's a long but fascinating tech talk on a real solution: [this video]
Unfortunately this enables someone to coerce or bribe you into voting for a certain candidate, since the coercer would be able to demand to see your receipt and verify you complied. Here's a rather long but very interesting tech talk about electronic voting schemes which maintain the secret ballot property: [this video]
Here's a link to slides from a talk Ronald Rivest gave back in March 2016 at ACM-IEEE: "Auditability and Verifiability of Elections" [link] It covers a lot of what I'm sure is going to be discussed in this thread, including vote receipts, coercion, verifiability that your vote is counted. Edit to add: And heres a good talk by Ben Adida speaking at Google for a "Theory and Practice of Cryptography" TechTalk series entitled "Verifying Elections with Crytography" from 2007. Good stuff there, too. [this video]
Ben Adida on verifying elections with cryptography
I think blockchain might have some application, but I'm unconvinced that computer technology alone is going to solve it. Have a look at this slide deck from Ron Rivest (of RSA fame). [link] I think he does a pretty good job of covering the history of modern voting and how technology can be properly applied. You might find this Google Tech Talk by Ben Adida "Verifying Elections with Cryptography" interesting as well: [this video]
Ben Adida on verifying elections with cryptography
There are documented issues with many existing electronic voting systems. E-voting encompasses a lot of different types of system that can involve computers in the chain, and not surprisingly all of them are equal. There have been a few discussions around voting on HN recently, and that's good. It's an important topic, as trust in the integrity of elections is vital for democracy. There's a lot of existing material out there about verifiable and auditable voting systems, especially in the wake of the 2000 US Presidential elections. I encourage you to take a look at what's out there. It can provide a great foundation for discussion. Here are some links I've found useful: Wikipedia page on End-to-End Auditable Voting Systems [link] Ron Rivest slide deck from March 2016. Auditability and Verifiability of Elections [link] Ben Adida Google Tech Talks December 19, 2007 Theory and Practice of Cryptography: Verifying Electiosns with Cryptography [this video]
Listed among useful starting points on verifiable voting
Going back to my original comment, widespread faith that the voting process is safe is just as important as whether it actually is. Casting doubt on the process without really solid evidence undermines this faith. By no means do I want to be Pollyannaish about this: it's too important. Which is why I want to see improvements in the voting process. If voting integrity is something you feel particularly strongly about (I certainly do), I encourage to look into the work that's already out there. The 2000 election spurred a lot of research. Some good starting points are: Ronald L. Rivest MIT Auditability and Verifiability of Elections ACM-IEEE talk March 16, 2016 [link] --- Ben Adida Google Tech Talks December 19, 2007 Theory and Practice of Cryptography: Verifying Electiosns with Cryptography [this video]
>The central issue with electronic voting is that it's opaque to observers. There was this interesting talk years ago. [this video] Does anyone in the space have a more up to date reference on where things are at ?
Verifying that the right binary was uploaded is solving the wrong problem. Who cares what the source code claims to do? We care about what it actually does. Real cryptographic voting systems use verifiable protocols. You don't trust the machine, you force it to follow a protocol that involves proving its actions are correct at every step. You can verify basically everything except destruction of information (i.e. there's no way to prove with cryptography that a video camera didn't record the voter). Video with an example of a verifiable voting protocol: [this video]
Why not use a non-bitcoin-based system and completely avoid the 51% attack? [this video] I'm not sure if this is state of the art[0] since the talk is 7 years old. This scheme provides proof to the voter, but not enough so he can prove his vote to someone else, avoiding vote selling altogether. The biggest challenge IMHO is trust in the system. [0] I'd appreciate criticism or any other progress in the field.
Voting scheme proving to voter without enabling vote selling
It's possible via homomorphic encryption, i.e. a way to manipulate cyphertext to make some mathematical operations like sums/products or logical comparisons without revealing the actual secrets. For example, it's possible to compare two encryptions of two numbers and get an encryption of their sum or to know which one is larger without knowing either. However one drawback of such a voting system would be an inability to get actual vote tallies, only an ordering of the candidates. There is an older google talk about this delving into more detail. [this video]
It entirely depends if it's using cryptography or not [1]. For example, using zero knowledge proofs you can be given a receipt that lets you verify your vote was included in the total (without allowing you to prove to an attacker which party you voted for). Using the computers as glorified counters is a security nightmare. Using them for what they're good at (crypto) would be a security boon, with the main downside being how hard it would be for non-computer-scientists to understand the nature of the security. 1: [this video]
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